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COMMENTARIES 
ENFORCING AUSTRALIAN LAW IN ANTARCTICA: 
THE HSI LITIGATION 
Enforcing Australian Law in Antarctica 
RUTH DAVIS* 
[Law enforcement in Antarctica is complicated by uncertainties regarding sovereignty and 
jurisdiction. In line with the usual practice of the Antarctic Treaty parties, Australia has 
generally refrained from enforcing its legislation for the Australian Antarctic Territory against 
foreigners. Recent litigation that attempts to enforce Australian whale protection laws against 
Japanese whalers in Antarctica represents a challenge to this traditional approach. The HSI 
Litigation highlights the ongoing difficulties faced by Australia in trying to effectively manage 
the Australian Antarctic Territory within the constraints of the Antarctic Treaty System. Using 
fisheries regulation and continental shelf delimitation as comparative examples, this commentary 
highlights the challenges of law enforcement facing the Antarctic legal regime, and the 
implications for Australian Antarctic law and policy. The traditionally restrained approach to 
law enforcement in Antarctica has allowed the Antarctic Treaty System to flourish and develop 
into a dynamic, and arguably quite effective, regime for the environmental protection of 
Antarctica. This is despite the fundamental disagreements between states over questions of 
territorial sovereignty. It seems likely that continuation of the HSI Litigation will provoke an 
international response from Japan, and potentially have further repercussions for the Antarctic 
Treaty System.] 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Law enforcement in Antarctica has always been problematic because of 
uncertainty regarding sovereignty and jurisdiction in the region. Litigation 
currently before the Federal Court of Australia has reignited the debate about the 
extent to which Antarctic Treaty1 parties can enforce their national laws against 
foreigners in the Antarctic.2  
The court action has been brought by an environmental group, Humane 
Society International (‘HSI’), against a Japanese company, Kyodo Senpaku 
Kaisha Ltd (‘Kyodo’). It relates to whaling operations that are alleged to have 
been conducted by Kyodo, contrary to Australian law, in the exclusive economic 
zone (‘EEZ’) offshore the Australian Antarctic Territory.  
On its face, the litigation appears to involve a fairly straightforward 
application of Australian laws for the protection of whales. Behind that facade, 
however, lies a complex web of international law obligations: the law of the sea, 
laws for the regulation of whaling and laws governing the Antarctic Treaty 
System.3 When viewed in this context, the litigation highlights the ongoing 
difficulties that Australia faces in relation to its assertion of sovereignty over the 
Australian Antarctic Territory. By raising questions about the ability of Australia 
to enforce its whale protection laws in Antarctica, the litigation also highlights 
the difficulties that Australia faces in trying to effectively manage the Australian 
Antarctic Territory within the constraints of the Antarctic Treaty System.  
After briefly noting the international law context, this commentary will 
outline the HSI Litigation, in particular highlighting the political aspects of the 
litigation. It will then place the litigation in the context of Australian activities in 
Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty. The commentary will then examine two 
issues that have been highlighted by this litigation: the assertion of jurisdiction 
over maritime areas and the enforcement of laws in Antarctica, in particular, 
laws dealing with fisheries and whaling. These issues will be assessed in 
reference to current Australian practice. 
This commentary seeks to place the HSI Litigation in its Australian and 
Antarctic context, and discuss issues relating to jurisdiction and law 
enforcement. Using fisheries regulation and continental shelf delimitation as 
comparative examples, it seeks to highlight the challenges posed by law 
enforcement for the Antarctic legal regime, and the implications for Australian 
Antarctic law and policy. 
                                                 
 1 Opened for signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force 23 June 1961). 
 2 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd (2006) 154 FCR 425 (‘HSI 
Case’), reversing Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2005] 
FCA 664 (Unreported, Allsop J, 27 May 2005). 
 3 The Antarctic Treaty System includes: the Antarctic Treaty, above n 1; Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals, opened for signature 1 June 1972, 1080 UNTS 175 
(entered into force 11 March 1978); Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources, opened for signature 20 May 1980, 1329 UNTS 47 (entered into force 
7 April 1982) (‘CCAMLR’); and various recommendations and measures that have been 
adopted under the main instruments. The most recent addition to the Antarctic Treaty 
System is the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for 
signature 4 October 1991, 30 ILM 1461 (entered into force 14 January 1998) (‘Madrid 
Protocol’). 
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II INTERNATIONAL LAW CONTEXT 
The HSI Litigation demonstrates how several international law regimes, 
which are not necessarily consistent, are relevant to an assessment of whaling 
activities in Antarctic waters. The first clearly applicable regime is the Antarctic 
Treaty System, the group of international agreements that have developed around 
the Antarctic Treaty. However, despite the clear focus of the Antarctic Treaty 
System upon environmental issues in general, and marine issues in particular, the 
issue of whaling is one that the Antarctic Treaty parties have tried to avoid. The 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(‘CCAMLR’), for example, has not been used for the management of cetaceans 
and specifically states that ‘[n]othing in this Convention shall derogate from the 
rights and obligations of Contracting Parties under the International Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling’.4 Similarly, Annex II to the Madrid Protocol, 
which prohibits the taking or harmful interference with native flora and fauna, 
also defers to the International Whaling Commission (‘IWC’) on whaling 
matters.5 Although the Antarctic Treaty is therefore not directly relevant to the 
issue of whaling, it is important for the general constraints that it places upon the 
assertion of sovereignty and the exercise of jurisdiction by parties in the region.6 
Whaling is regulated at international law through the IWC, established under 
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (‘ICRW’) in 1946.7 
Australia and Japan are both parties to this Convention. The IWC has maintained 
a moratorium on commercial whaling since the mid-1980s,8 and Antarctic waters 
have been protected as a part of the Southern Ocean Sanctuary since 1994.9 
Japan has, however, continued to engage in limited whaling pursuant to the 
exemption for scientific research under art VIII of the ICRW. At the time of the 
alleged offences, the respondent, Kyodo, was whaling pursuant to a special 
research permit issued by the Japanese Government. 
The ICRW does not provide a complete answer, however, as the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’),10 to which Australia and 
Japan are both signatories,11 is also relevant. Article 65 of UNCLOS entitles a 
coastal state such as Australia to ‘prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of 
marine mammals’ within its EEZ. It is in pursuit of this right that Australia has 
                                                 
 4 CCAMLR, above n 3, art VI.  
 5 Madrid Protocol, above n 3, Annex II, art 7. Note, though, that the remaining provisions of 
the Madrid Protocol (including Annex I, relating to environmental impact assessments) are 
not so limited.  
 6 See below Part V. 
 7 Opened for signature 2 December 1946, 161 UNTS 72 (entered into force 10 November 
1948). 
 8 Ibid sch III(6). 
 9 Ibid sch III(7)(b). This was established at the 46th meeting of the IWC in 1994. Japan 
formally objected to the sanctuary and is not bound by it. 
 10 Opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 
1994). 
 11 UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Status of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the Implementation of 
Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the Convention relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (2007) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/ 
status2006.pdf> at 18 May 2007. 
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enacted its whale protection provisions and provided for their application in its 
declared EEZ off the coast of the Australian Antarctic Territory.  
III THE HSI CASE 
HSI’s statement of claim alleged that, between February 2001 and March 
2004, the respondent, Kyodo, had unlawfully killed, taken or interfered with 
around 428 Antarctic minke whales in the Australian Whale Sanctuary located 
off the coast of the Australian Antarctic Territory.12 HSI also gave particulars of 
a permit issued to Kyodo by the Japanese Government for an ongoing whale 
research program.13 This permit indicated that the killing of whales would 
continue.14 
In its application, HSI sought the enforcement of sections of the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (‘EPBC Act’) that 
prohibit both the taking or killing of whales within the Australian Whale 
Sanctuary and the subsequent possession or treatment of such whales.15 The 
EPBC Act permits private individuals and organisations to obtain an injunction 
restraining conduct in contravention of the Act, provided that they are an 
‘interested’ party.16 Because the respondent is located in Japan, however, the 
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) required HSI to seek the Court’s leave before it 
could serve its originating process.17 
At first instance, the Court refused to grant leave to serve outside the 
jurisdiction on the grounds that the action was likely to be futile and could be 
contrary to Australia’s national interests.18 Justice Allsop took the unusual step 
of inviting the Commonwealth Attorney-General to make submissions ‘on the 
proper construction and interpretation of the legislation and treaties involved, in 
particular in the light of what might be seen to be Australia’s national interest, 
including inter-governmental relations between Australia and Japan’.19  
The Attorney-General’s submissions indicated that, in the view of the 
Australian Government, any attempt to enforce Australian law against Japanese 
nationals in the Australian Whale Sanctuary would be seen by Japan as a breach 
of international law and give rise to an international dispute.20 Furthermore, 
because of the sensitive nature of Antarctic sovereignty claims, the enforcement 
of domestic laws against foreigners would probably also lead to an adverse 
                                                 
 12 Humane Society International v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd, ‘Statement of Claim’ 
(Statement of Claim of Humane Society International) (19 October 2004) [6(b)]–[6(e)], 
available from <http://www.hsi.org.au> at 18 May 2007. 
 13 Ibid [7]. 
 14 Ibid [11]. 
 15 See below Part VIII. 
 16 EPBC Act 1999 (Cth) s 475. 
 17 Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 8, r 3. 
 18 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2005] FCA 664 
(Unreported, Allsop J, 27 May 2005). 
 19 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd (2004) 292 ALR 551, 552. 
 20 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd (2004) Federal Court of 
Australia, Doc NSD 1519 of 2004, Outline of Submissions of the Attorney-General of the 
Commonwealth as Amicus Curiae. See also Allsop J’s summary of the Attorney-General’s 
submissions: Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2005] FCA 
664 (Unreported, Allsop J, 27 May 2005) [4]–[16]. 
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reaction by other parties to the Antarctic Treaty.21 In light of these concerns, it 
has been the Australian Government’s practice to only enforce Australian law in 
Antarctica against foreigners who have submitted to Australian jurisdiction.22 
Therefore, although the EPBC Act applies as a matter of Australian law, the 
‘pursuit of diplomatic solutions’ has been seen as a ‘more appropriate’ response 
to the issues posed by Japanese whaling offshore the Australian Antarctic 
Territory.23  
Justice Allsop was very concerned that, as well as being futile, the litigation 
could place the Federal Court ‘at the centre of an international dispute … 
between Australia and a friendly foreign power’.24 He concluded that, ‘in all the 
circumstances, I should not exercise a discretion to place the Court in such a 
position’,25 and refused the application. 
Justice Allsop’s decision was reversed on appeal to the Full Federal Court on 
14 July 2006.26 Interestingly, none of the appeal judges gave any weight to the 
political considerations that had beset the case at first instance.27 Justice Moore, 
who would have dismissed the appeal on other grounds, agreed with the majority 
on this point: 
Courts must be prepared to hear and determine matters whatever their political 
sensitivity either domestically or internationally. To approach the matter 
otherwise, is to compromise the role of the courts as the forum in which rights can 
be vindicated whatever the subject matter of the proceedings.28 
In general terms, it is difficult to argue with Moore J’s conclusion. To decide 
otherwise would be to usurp the proper role of the judiciary in a democratic 
society. Outside the narrow confines of the judicial function, however, the 
broader context of the dispute should not be ignored. The HSI Litigation is not 
only the first real test for Australia’s anti-whaling provisions, it is also the first 
real challenge to Australia’s Antarctic legal regime. It results from an unusual set 
of circumstances that have combined to make litigation possible where normally 
it would be avoided.  
IV A BRIEF HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANTARCTICA 
The HSI Litigation is set against a background of a longstanding interest by 
Australia in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. In the early days of Antarctic 
                                                 
 21 Outline of Submissions of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth as Amicus Curiae, 
above n 20, [16]. 
 22 Ibid. 
 23 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2005] FCA 664 
(Unreported, Allsop J, 27 May 2005) [16]. 
 24 Ibid [35]. 
 25 Ibid [36]. 
 26 HSI Case (2006) 154 FCR 425. 
 27 Instead, the focus of the Full Court decision was on the existence or otherwise of the 
discretion that Allsop J had purported to exercise, the irrelevance of political considerations 
to the court’s task in determining whether or not to grant leave, and the possible futility of 
the action should HSI prove successful. 
 28 HSI Case (2006) 154 FCR 425, 435. 
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exploration, Australia was important both as a starting point for voyages of 
discovery and as a centre for the whaling industry.29 
From the early 1800s, whaling and Southern Ocean exploration were closely 
linked. In the summer of 1840–41, for example, a British expedition led by 
Captain James Clark Ross managed to break through the Antarctic ice pack and, 
amongst other things, discovered Victoria Land (on the eastern border of what is 
now the Australian Antarctic Territory). In his own account of the expedition, 
Ross reported sighting large numbers of black, sperm and humpback whales in 
high latitudes,30 and commented that ‘[a] fresh source of national and individual 
wealth is thus opened to commercial enterprise, and if pursued with boldness and 
perseverance, it cannot fail to be abundantly productive’.31 
Later, licenses to conduct whaling operations were used by the British and 
Australian Governments to support their claims to sovereignty. Licensees were 
required to ‘hoist and maintain the British Flag over any and every establishment 
that they may erect or maintain in the lands or territorial waters’ of Antarctica.32 
Substantial exploration of land now claimed by Australia was undertaken by 
Captain Robert Falcon Scott during the period 1901–04. Exploration of the area 
was continued by Sir Douglas Mawson’s Australian Antarctic Expedition of 
1911–14 and the 1929–31 British, Australian and New Zealand Antarctic 
Research Expeditions, also led by Mawson.33 
Discoveries made during these latter two expeditions formed the basis of a 
British claim to sovereignty over a portion of the Antarctic continent.34 The 
claimed area was then formally transferred to Australia and became known as the 
Australian Antarctic Territory.35 The claim was to a sector of the continent 
covering ‘all the islands and territories other than Adélie Land which are situated 
south of the 60th degree of South Latitude and lying between the 160th degree of 
East Longitude and the 45th degree of East Longitude’.36 The territorial claim 
                                                 
 29 Both are discussed extensively in Robert A Swan, Australia in the Antarctic: Interest, 
Activity and Endeavour (1961). See especially chs 8, 11–15. 
 30 Ibid 30, citing James Clark Ross, A Voyage of Discovery and Research in the Southern and 
Antarctic Regions During the Years 1839–43 (1847) vol 1, 169, 192 
 31 Ibid. 
 32 Whaling Licence to the Kerguelen Sealing and Whaling Company, Limited in Respect of the 
Area From Enderby to Queen Mary Lands, 3 October 1928, as reproduced in William Bush, 
Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and National Documents 
(1982) vol 2, 109–13. 
 33 See Proclamation Read on Proclamation Island, 13 January 1930 (Douglas Mawson), as 
reproduced in William Bush, Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State 
and National Documents (1982) vol 2, 120–1; Proclamation Made from the Air over the 
Antarctic Continent near Proclamation Island, 25 January 1930 (Douglas Mawson), as 
reproduced in William Bush, Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State 
and National Documents (1982) vol 2, 120. 
 34 Order in Council Placing Certain Territory in the Antarctic Seas under the Authority of the 
Commonwealth of Australia (7 February 1933), as reproduced in William Bush, Antarctica 
and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and National Documents (1982) vol 2, 
142–3 (‘Order in Council’). 
 35 Formal acceptance of the Australian Antarctic Territory by Australia was required under 
s 122 of the Australian Constitution. This acceptance was given under s 2 of the Australian 
Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933 (Cth). 
 36 Order in Council, above n 34, 143. 
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was not widely recognised, a situation that continues today and casts a shadow 
over Australian legislative and enforcement activity for the territory.37 
Contemporaneous policy statements show that whaling has always been a 
major concern for Australian Antarctic policy. On the establishment of the 
Australian Antarctic Territory, the Minister for External Affairs spoke of the 
need for authority to regulate the whaling industry as being an important factor 
behind Australia’s Antarctic claim.38 In addition, his speech emphasised the 
strategic value of the region and its scientific importance, in particular for 
meteorological research and long-range Australian weather forecasting.39 
To a large degree, the scientific and strategic goals remain central today, 
although current policy recognises the need to act through the Antarctic Treaty 
System.40 Complying with Antarctic Treaty obligations, cooperating with 
Antarctic Treaty partners and maintaining a position of influence within the 
Antarctic Treaty System are of great importance.41 Apart from incorporating the 
international framework of the Antarctic Treaty System, the major shift in 
Australia’s Antarctic policy over this time has been the evolution from a resource 
management perspective to one that focuses on environmental protection and 
resource conservation.42  
V MANAGEMENT OF ANTARCTICA UNDER THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 
To fully appreciate the significance of the HSI Litigation, it is necessary to 
consider the operation of the Antarctic Treaty System, in particular the manner in 
which issues of territorial sovereignty are dealt with under that system. 
Sovereignty has been a continuous source of tension in relation to Antarctic 
activities and resources. Prior to the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, 
seven states had claimed a portion of the Antarctic continent: Australia, 
New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, France, Norway and the United Kingdom.43 
Three of the claims overlap (UK, Argentina and Chile), whilst a large proportion 
of the continent remains unclaimed. None of the asserted claims are widely 
recognised.44 
There are significant problems in applying the traditional rules of 
international law to the acquisition of Antarctic territory. According to 
established principles of international law, mere discovery of territory leads only 
to an inchoate title, and must be followed by activities that demonstrate an 
intention to act as sovereign in order for title to be perfected.45 The problem with 
                                                 
 37 Only the UK, New Zealand, France and Norway recognise the Australian claim: Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Parliament of 
Australia, Australian Law in Antarctica (1992) 9 (‘Standing Committee Report’). 
 38 Swan, above n 29, 208–9. 
 39 Ibid, citing Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 
1933, 1953 (John Latham, Attorney-General). 
 40 Australian Government Antarctic Division, Statement of Purposes and Values (2004) 
<http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=6267> at 18 May 2007. 
 41 Ibid. 
 42 See Marcus Haward et al, ‘Australia’s Antarctic Agenda’ (2006) 60 Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 439. 
 43 Outline of Submissions of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth as Amicus Curiae, 
above n 20, [6]. 
 44 Standing Committee Report, above n 37, 9. 
 45 Island of Palmas Case (the Netherlands v US) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 831. 
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Antarctic territorial claims arises from the inhospitable nature of the polar 
regions and the fact that they cannot be ‘settled’ in any conventional sense.  
Instead, claimant states have relied heavily on the formal provision of legal 
and administrative measures, the establishment of scientific bases and the 
implementation of ongoing Antarctic research programs to demonstrate their 
intention to assert sovereignty.46 Whether or not these actions would be 
sufficient to establish title has not been formally tested, and this approach is one 
that, in Australia at least, has come up against considerable criticism.47  
Since 1959, the issue of territorial sovereignty has officially been put aside in 
favour of regional cooperation under the Antarctic Treaty. The Antarctic Treaty 
is a relatively short document that applies to the area south of latitude 60 degrees 
south.48 It requires that Antarctica be used only for peaceful purposes, provides 
for freedom of scientific investigation and encourages international cooperation 
and exchange of information and personnel.49 In addition to the agreement 
relating to sovereignty,50 the parties agree that jurisdiction over certain persons 
in Antarctica remains with their national government, wherever they may be in 
Antarctica.51  
The mechanism for avoiding sovereignty disputes under art IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty is superficially quite simple. The Antarctic Treaty itself does 
not affect existing claims or potential claims, nor the (non)recognition of such 
claims by any contracting party.52 The parties agree that acts or activities taking 
place while the Antarctic Treaty is in force cannot ‘constitute a basis for 
asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty … or create 
any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica’.53 In addition, there is a ban on making 
any new claim or enlarging an existing claim whilst the Antarctic Treaty is 
operative.54 
                                                 
 46 For example, Australia bases its claim to sovereignty on 
acts of discovery and formal claims of title by British and Australian explorers, the 
formal transfer of the territory from Britain to Australia and Australian acceptance by 
legislation, and subsequent acts showing an intention by Australia to exercise 
sovereignty over the Territory. This intention is demonstrated, inter alia, by the 
application by Australia of legislation to the Territory, the negotiation and conclusion 
of treaties affecting the Territory and by the engagement in a degree of administrative 
activity there. 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 November 1979, 
3502 (Andrew Peacock, Minister for Foreign Affairs). 
 47 Standing Committee Report, above n 37, chs 2, 3. 
 48 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art VI. 
 49 Ibid arts I, II, III. 
 50 Ibid art IV. 
 51 Ibid art VIII. 
 52 Ibid art IV(1). 
 53 Ibid art IV(2). 
 54 Ibid. 
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There are now 45 state parties to the Antarctic Treaty: the 12 original parties 
who were invited to the 1959 Washington Conference at which the Antarctic 
Treaty was negotiated, and the 33 states that have since acceded to the Treaty.55 
A key feature of the management regime that has developed out of the Antarctic 
Treaty is that it is ‘based on consensus and collaboration’.56 Article IX 
establishes a system of regular meetings of the Antarctic Treaty parties, known 
as the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (‘ATCMs’), at which they may 
devise ‘measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty’.57 
The 12 original parties, plus 16 of the acceding states, have the status of 
Consultative Party and are entitled to vote on such measures.58 The remaining 
states can attend ATCMs but cannot participate in formal decision-making.59  
VI SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION 
Despite the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, sovereignty remains a source 
of underlying tension within the Antarctic Treaty System. Although the Antarctic 
Treaty clearly bans the assertion of new claims,60 it does not clearly set limits for 
acceptable behaviour by states that made claims prior to the signing of the 
Antarctic Treaty.  
A significant issue faced by claimant states, including Australia, is the fact 
that the Antarctic Treaty is not a universal agreement: currently only 45 countries 
are parties.61 The prospect of defending a claim against a non-party requires that 
a claimant state demonstrate its intentions regarding sovereignty through the 
provision of legal and administrative measures; merely relying upon the 
protection of art IV of the Antarctic Treaty is insufficient. However, this requires 
a delicate balancing act, as implementing such measures too aggressively could 
be seen as a breach of the Antarctic Treaty. These apparently conflicting goals 
create a tension that is clearly illustrated by the HSI Litigation. 
The tension is evident in two particular issues that are highlighted by the 
circumstances of the litigation. First is the uncertain status of maritime zones 
around the Antarctic continent. Second is the general question of enforcement of 
domestic laws by states in Antarctica. 
                                                 
 55 Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, ATCM Contacts (2007) <http://www.ats.aq/uploaded/ 
listofcontacts.pdf> at 18 May 2007. 
 56 Haward et al, above n 42, 446. 
 57 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art IX. 
 58 Ibid art IX(4). 
 59 The Treaty permits acceding states to participate in ATCMs ‘during such time as that 
[acceding state] demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific 
research activity there’: ibid art IX(2). 
 60 Ibid art IV(2). 
 61 Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, above n 55. 
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A Maritime Zones in Antarctica 
Maritime claims to the waters around Antarctica present even greater 
difficulties than territorial claims.62 International law relating to maritime zones 
has evolved considerably since the Antarctic Treaty was signed, and is now 
embodied in UNCLOS. In relation to Antarctica, there is a threshold question 
about the ability of any state to regard itself as a ‘coastal state’, thus giving it the 
right to assert a maritime zone.63 Assuming that this hurdle can be passed, there 
is also the problem that maritime claims, or extensions of claims, run the risk of 
offending art IV(2) of the Antarctic Treaty.64  
Australian practice with regard to Antarctic maritime zones reflects the 
conflicting demands of sovereignty and Treaty membership. Australia has been 
active in asserting Antarctic maritime zones, but in practice has sought only to 
enforce them against its own nationals. Australia claims a territorial sea adjacent 
to the Australian Antarctic Territory,65 which it extended from three to twelve 
nautical miles in 1990, apparently without protest.66 In line with UNCLOS, it 
also claims part of the Antarctic continental shelf and an EEZ.67  
The continental shelf claim provides a useful example of how Japan and other 
Treaty partners might be expected to react to Australia’s enforcement of whale 
protection laws in Antarctica. Australia’s original continental shelf claim 
predates the Antarctic Treaty.68 In 2004, however, pursuant to its rights under 
art 76 of UNCLOS, Australia lodged an extended continental shelf claim with the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.69 As a part of its claim, 
Australia included data pertaining to the continental shelf offshore Antarctica. 
However, a diplomatic note accompanying the submission requested that the 
Commission not examine that portion of the data. This note appears to be an 
                                                 
 62 The issue is well documented: see, eg, Donald R Rothwell, ‘A Maritime Analysis of 
Conflicting International Law Regimes in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean’ (1994) 
15 Australian Yearbook of International Law 155; Stuart Kaye and Donald R Rothwell 
‘Australia’s Antarctic Maritime Claims and Boundaries’ (1995) 26 Ocean Development and 
International Law 195; Christopher C Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea (1992) 
ch 3; Sir Arthur Watts, International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System (1992) chs 5−6; 
Phillipe Gautier, ‘The Maritime Area of the Antarctic and the New Law of the Sea’ in Joe 
Verhoeven, Philippe Sands and Maxwell Bruce (eds), The Antarctic Environment and 
International Law (1992) 121. 
 63 UNCLOS, above n 10, art 55. 
 64 Which, it may be recalled, bans the assertion of new territorial claims or the extension of 
existing claims.  
 65 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) s 6. 
 66 Brian R Opeskin and Donald R Rothwell, ‘Australia’s Territorial Sea: International and 
Federal Implications of Its Extension to 12 Miles’ (1991) 22 Ocean Development and 
International Law 395, 402. 
 67 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) ss 10A, 11. 
 68 Proclamation Claiming Sovereign Rights over the Continental Shelf of Australia and its 
Territories, 10 September 1953, as reproduced in William Bush, Antarctica and 
International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and National Documents (1982) vol 2, 172–3. 
 69 Commonwealth of Australia, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Submission 
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attempt by Australia to satisfy its Treaty partners, whilst at the same time 
preserving its territorial claim:  
Australia recalls the principles and objectives shared by the Antarctic Treaty and 
UNCLOS, and the importance of the Antarctic system and UNCLOS working in 
harmony and thereby ensuring the continuing peaceful cooperation, security and 
stability in the Antarctic area … [Having regard to the] special legal and political 
status of Antarctica under the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty … Australia 
requests the Commission in accordance with its rules not to take any action for 
the time being with regard to the information in this submission that relates to 
continental shelf appurtenant to Antarctica.70  
Australia’s submission provoked responses by eight nations, six on the basis 
of its Antarctic implications. The US response, contained in a diplomatic note 
dated 3 December 2004, is representative of the responses received. It referred to 
‘the importance of the Antarctic system and [UNCLOS] working in harmony and 
thereby ensuring the continuing peaceful cooperation, security and stability in 
the Antarctic area’.71 The US also affirmed its non-recognition of Antarctic 
territorial claims, and acknowledged ‘with appreciation Australia’s request’ that 
the Commission not examine the Antarctic component.72  
Japan’s response was framed in stronger terms. After stating that it did not 
recognise any of the territorial claims, nor any of the claims over the waters or 
seabed adjacent to the Antarctic continent, it went on to stress ‘that the balance 
of rights and obligations in the Antarctic Treaty should not be affected in any 
way in handling [Australia’s submission]’.73 Further, it directly requested ‘the 
Commission not to take any action on the portion of Australia’s submission 
relating to [Antarctica]’.74  
The international reaction to Australia’s extended continental shelf claim 
demonstrates the continued sensitivity of Antarctic territorial claims. It provides 
some evidence of how the international community might be expected to react 
should the HSI Litigation reach the final stage of enforcement. 
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B Enforcement Jurisdiction 
The HSI Litigation also raises the issue of jurisdiction over individuals in 
Antarctica. The question is dealt with in the Antarctic Treaty, but only to a very 
limited extent. Individuals in Antarctica who are designated as observers under 
art VII(1) of the Antarctic Treaty, or scientific personnel who are on exchange 
with another Treaty party pursuant to art III(1)(b), are subject only to the 
jurisdiction of their own state.75 This restriction is fairly limited in scope, and is 
‘without prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating 
to jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica’.76 Therefore, while 
jurisdiction based upon nationality is prescribed for a limited class of 
individuals, the Antarctic Treaty is silent on the question of claimant states 
asserting jurisdiction upon the basis of territoriality. 
 Watts comments that ‘any assertion of jurisdiction based on the possession of 
territorial sovereignty over the area where something happens may be fraught 
with complications’.77 He states that: 
Fortunately, the jurisdictional uncertainties in Antarctica have not in practice led 
to major international confrontations … [because, inter alia] the States concerned 
have appreciated the value to their own interests of not pushing to their logical 
conclusion the legal rights to which they believe themselves entitled.78  
The approach to jurisdiction conventionally taken by the Australian Government 
has followed this circumspect approach. If successful, the HSI Litigation would 
involve pushing Australia’s legal rights beyond that usual level of restraint. 
There are two levels at which the issue of jurisdiction operates. First is the 
assertion of legislative jurisdiction over Antarctic territory through the passing of 
laws which apply to all persons within such territory. In practice, the passing of 
such legislation is not uncommon amongst Antarctic claimant states, and has not 
of itself caused any great difficulty amongst Antarctic Treaty parties.79 The 
second level at which jurisdiction becomes relevant is at the enforcement level. 
If a claimant state were to attempt to enforce its laws against foreign nationals, 
this would be expected to generate protest. 
At this point it is useful to consider the manner in which Australia has 
legislated for Antarctica, and the extent of jurisdiction claimed. The Australian 
Antarctic Territory Act 1954 (Cth) provides a general legal regime for the 
Australian Antarctic Territory. As well as importing most of the laws of the 
Australian Capital Territory, s 8(1) of the Australian Antarctic Territory Act 
1954 (Cth) provides for the Commonwealth to make laws that expressly apply in 
the Australian Antarctic Territory. Laws made specifically for the Australian 
Antarctic Territory include the Antarctic Treaty Act 1960 (Cth) (‘Antarctic 
Treaty Act’), the Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) Act 1980 (Cth) 
(‘Antarctic Treaty (EP) Act’), the Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
Conservation Act 1981 (Cth) (‘AMLRC Act’), and regulations made under the 
latter two Acts. Other Commonwealth laws that apply generally in Australia can 
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be expressed to extend to the Australian Antarctic Territory, as is the case with 
the EPBC Act. 
The general restrictions upon jurisdiction in the Antarctic Treaty are given 
effect by the Antarctic Treaty Act. Designated observers and scientific personnel 
on exchange who are not Australian citizens are not subject to Australian laws in 
the Australian Antarctic Territory. Conversely, Australian observers and 
scientists are subject to Australian law (and only Australian law) wherever they 
may be in Antarctica.80 Beyond these minimum requirements, the application of 
different Australian laws to persons in the Australian Antarctic Territory is 
varied.81 The Antarctic Treaty (EP) Act takes a broad view of jurisdiction and 
applies to all persons, including foreigners — subject only to the limitations in 
s 4(1) of the Antarctic Treaty Act. Conversely, fisheries laws take a much more 
restricted approach to jurisdiction in the Australian Antarctic Territory, applying 
only to Australian nationals.  
Regardless of how the laws are drafted, it has been the Australian 
Government’s practice not to enforce Australian laws in Antarctica against 
non-nationals.82 In the HSI Litigation, the Attorney-General stated that 
the Australian Government has not enforced its laws in Antarctica against the 
nationals of other States which are Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, except when 
such persons have voluntarily subjected themselves to Australian law … as each 
Party has responsibility for the activities of its own nationals under the Antarctic 
Treaty.83 
Whilst this would appear to overstate the level of protection offered under 
art VIII of the Antarctic Treaty, it indicates the conservative approach to 
enforcement traditionally taken by the Australian Government. 
Examination of the EPBC Act in light of other Australian laws for Antarctica 
demonstrates that the EPBC Act, whilst not unusual in the extent of jurisdiction 
that it asserts, is quite exceptional in the manner in which the legislation can be 
enforced. The examples of fisheries and whale protection laws will now be 
examined to provide a benchmark against which the current regime for whale 
protection in the Australian Whale Sanctuary may be assessed. 
VII REGULATION OF FISHERIES 
Antarctic fisheries are regulated under the AMLRC Act, which implements 
Australia’s obligations under CCAMLR. The AMLRC Act operates in conjunction 
with Australia’s principal fisheries legislation, the Fisheries Management Act 
1991 (Cth) (‘Fisheries Management Act’).  
Both pieces of legislation use the concept of an Australian Fishing Zone 
(‘AFZ’) as the basis for defining who is subject to Australian fisheries 
regulation. The AMLRC Act applies to Australians wherever they may be, but 
only applies to non-nationals when located within the AFZ.84 As there is no AFZ 
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around Antarctica, fisheries regulations can only be applied to Australian citizens 
in those waters.85 In addition, the AMLRC Act applies subject to ‘the obligations 
of Australia under international law, including obligations under any 
international agreement binding on Australia’.86  
It is interesting to consider why Australian fisheries law does not apply to the 
waters around the Australian Antarctic Territory. In 1979, when control of 
fishing activities out to 200 nautical miles was first asserted by Australia,87 the 
Antarctic Treaty parties were in the process of negotiating the CCAMLR. It was 
therefore thought appropriate to exclude Australian Antarctic Territory waters 
from the AFZ, so as not to affect the negotiations.88 When enacted in 1991, the 
Fisheries Management Act defined the AFZ in the same manner as earlier 
fisheries legislation: as the waters adjacent to Australia and its external territories 
out to 200 nautical miles, but excluding, inter alia, waters that are ‘excepted 
waters’.89 Exclusion of Australian Antarctic Territory waters was continued 
under the Fisheries Management Act by proclamation on 14 February 1992.90  
In 1994, when UNCLOS came into force and Australia formally established 
an EEZ, the basis of the AFZ was changed to reflect this development.91 The 
AFZ is now defined as the waters adjacent to Australia and its external 
territories, and within the EEZ, but excluding the coastal waters of a state or 
internal territory, and excluding excepted waters.92 When Australia declared its 
EEZ in 1994, it did so for waters adjacent to all of its external territories, 
including the Australian Antarctic Territory. However, as the 1992 proclamation 
under the Fisheries Management Act remains in force, the waters offshore the 
Australian Antarctic Territory continue to be excepted from the AFZ. 
The non-application of Australian fishing laws to foreigners in Australia’s 
Antarctic EEZ was strongly criticised by the 1992 Parliamentary Committee 
examining the legal regime of the Australian Antarctic Territory.93 It stated that 
the ‘application of Australian law to the Australian Antarctic Territory is an 
assertion of jurisdiction and therefore an essential element in the maintenance of 
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Australia’s claim to sovereignty over the Territory’.94 It therefore recommended 
that 
the Fisheries Management Act 1991 be amended to include in the Australian 
Fishing Zone the 200 nautical miles adjacent to the Australian Antarctic Territory 
so as to extend Australian jurisdiction to the activities of non-Contracting Parties 
to the Antarctic Treaty.95  
However, the Australian Government’s view appears to be that a balance has 
to be drawn between protecting Australia’s sovereign rights and cooperating with 
other Treaty parties within the Antarctic Treaty System. Maintenance of the 
Treaty System, and of Australia’s influence within it, is a central concern of 
Australia’s Antarctic policy.96 There is a concern that if Australia actively seeks 
to enforce its laws against foreigners in the Australian Antarctic Territory, then 
the benefits of cooperation under the Antarctic Treaty could be lost.97  
VIII REGULATION OF WHALING 
The regulation of Antarctic fisheries may be contrasted with the operation of 
the Australian Whale Sanctuary and, in particular, the provisions under which 
HSI is challenging Japanese whaling in Antarctica. The Australian Whale 
Sanctuary was established under s 225(1) of the EPBC Act ‘in order to give 
formal recognition of the high level of protection and management afforded to 
cetaceans in Commonwealth marine areas and prescribed waters’. Like the AFZ, 
the location of the Australian Whale Sanctuary is defined principally by 
reference to Australia’s EEZ.98 Unlike the AFZ, however, it includes the waters 
offshore the Australian Antarctic Territory, up to 200 nautical miles from 
baselines.99  
The EPBC Act specifies various offences, including killing or injuring a 
cetacean, taking or interfering with a cetacean, possessing a cetacean or treating 
(processing) a cetacean.100 Its application varies depending upon the location of 
the relevant offence. Within Australia’s EEZ, the EPBC Act applies both to 
Australians and to nationals of other countries.101  
Regulation of whaling activities in Antarctic waters is not new. Australia has 
had regulations dealing with whaling in place since the Australian Antarctic 
Territory was established. Both the Whaling Act 1935 (Cth) and Whaling Act 
1960 (Cth) had some operation in relation to waters offshore the Australian 
Antarctic Territory.102 In 1980, following a change in government policy, the 
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focus on regulation of whaling was replaced by legislation directed at whale 
conservation — the Whale Protection Act 1980 (Cth) (‘Whale Protection Act’). 
The operation of the Whale Protection Act in relation to waters off the coast 
of the Australian Antarctic Territory was originally unclear. The Act ‘extended’ 
to every external territory, which clearly included the Australian Antarctic 
Territory.103 However, outside the AFZ it applied only to Australians and 
Australian vessels.104 Elsewhere it applied to all persons and all vessels.105 As 
was explained above in relation to fisheries, waters around the Australian 
Antarctic Territory were officially excluded from the AFZ; that is, no attempt 
was made to regulate foreign whaling activities in Australia’s Antarctic fisheries.  
In 1994, when Australia declared an EEZ offshore the Australian Antarctic 
Territory, the territorial basis of the Whale Protection Act’s operation was also 
changed from the AFZ to the EEZ.106 Therefore, all whaling in the EEZ offshore 
the Australian Antarctic Territory became prohibited under Australian law. The 
Whale Protection Act, however, expressly stated that its provisions were ‘subject 
to the obligations of Australia under international law’,107 presumably preventing 
its application to whaling activities that were carried out in accordance with the 
ICRW. 
In 1999, the regime under the Whale Protection Act was brought within the 
more general scope of the EPBC Act. The operation of the EPBC Act provisions 
has already been explained. For current purposes, two changes from the previous 
regime are significant. The first is the omission of any requirement that the 
provisions be read subject to international law.108 The second is the importation 
of broad enforcement provisions,109 including third party enforcement, that have 
come to be characteristic of environmental laws.110 
Actual enforcement of Australian anti-whaling laws in the Australian 
Antarctic Territory has followed the circumspect approach described above.111 
Although the broadly drafted laws clearly apply, in practice they are not enforced 
against foreign nationals. This approach to enforcement has been adopted in 
order to balance the often conflicting goals of preserving Australia’s sovereignty 
claim whilst acting in a cooperative and collaborative manner within the 
Antarctic Treaty System.112 Against this background, the HSI Litigation 
represents a substantial departure from standard practice. 
Other major environmental laws that apply in the Australian Antarctic 
Territory, such as the Antarctic Treaty (EP) Act, do not contain procedures to 
compel enforcement. This can be contrasted with the third party enforcement 
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provisions of the EPBC Act. Allowing for the laws to be enforced at the behest of 
an ‘interested party’113 has effectively removed the Australian Government’s 
discretion regarding whether to enforce the laws in Antarctica, and introduced an 
element over which the government lacks control. This is contrary to the manner 
in which Antarctic activities have historically been dealt with, and defeats the 
mechanism that has been used to diffuse any conflicts over sovereignty.  
IX CONCLUSION 
Legislation for the Australian Antarctic Territory has historically been 
restrained in its application to foreigners. Although formal restrictions in the 
Antarctic Treaty are very narrow and certainly would not prevent Australia from 
enforcing its laws against foreigners, in practice, the parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty have refrained from doing so, and Australia has followed this general 
practice. This approach has worked well and allowed the Antarctic Treaty 
System to flourish and develop into a dynamic, and arguably quite effective, 
regime for the environmental protection of Antarctica, despite fundamental 
disagreements over questions of territorial sovereignty. 
The attempt by HSI to enforce Australian whale protection laws against 
Japanese whalers in Antarctica is a challenge to this traditional approach to 
Antarctic law enforcement. Examining the provisions of the EPBC Act that are 
the subject of the HSI Litigation, two conclusions can be drawn. First, although 
it is not unusual for legislation to be drafted so as to apply to foreigners in 
Antarctica, it stands in marked contrast to Australian fisheries laws in this 
respect. Second, it has been the practice of Australian governments not to 
enforce Australia’s Antarctic laws against non-nationals, even where those laws, 
on their face, apply. The provisions of the EPBC Act which allow it to be 
enforced by third parties have removed the government’s discretion as to 
whether or not to enforce the laws against non-nationals in the Australian 
Antarctic Territory.  
It is curious that this situation has arisen in the first place. The current 
legislative regime for whale protection appears to have developed in an ad hoc 
fashion, perhaps without a full appreciation of where the various changes might 
lead. It seems likely that continuation of the HSI Litigation will at some point 
lead to an international response, at least by Japan and possibly by other parties 
to the Antarctic Treaty.114 If Australia’s submission to the UN Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf is anything to go by, the attempts to enforce 
Australian environmental laws against foreign whalers will not go unchallenged. 
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